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ABSTRACT
There is an upsurge for foreign investment in developing countries. Developing countries that
seek foreign investment actually prefer foreign direct investment. The issue of foreign direct
investment has become a controversial issue among developing countries. Though this type of
investment provides economic growth, employment, and infrastructure development, developing
countries may also suffer legal and economic manipulation by the foreign investors at the
expense of their countries’ resources. The foreign investment policies of developing countries
that seek such foreign direct investment ultimately determine the actions of foreign investors. In
many developing countries, foreign investment policies and other investment regulation are
catalysts to the desire for economic growth than proponents of such growth. This paper seeks to
examine the concept of foreign direct investment in developing countries.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Purpose of the study
Many developing countries seem to believe that economic growth cannot be solely obtained
from dependence on their own assets. Hence foreign investment is the answer to many economic
problems among developing countries. Any country with a Gross National Income (GNI) per
capita of more than $6000 is a developed country. 1 A country with per capita GNI less than this
is classified as “developing”. 2 There is a general misconception that all developing countries are
extremely poor. Though some countries may be classified as “developing” they all do not share
the same or even similar economic ratings, some developing countries are more advanced than
others. 3 FDI occurs when foreign investors establish businesses inside a foreign country . 4 There
are three forms of FDI: (1) Greenfield investments, (2) cross-border merger and acquisition type
of investment and (3) brownfield investments. 5. Greenfield investments create new assets or
facilities through new companies, ne w subsidiaries, or joint ventures where the foreign investor
takes a controlling equity stake. 6 The cross-border merger and acquisition type of investment
occurs when a foreign company acquires the assets of an existing foreign company or enters into
a merger agreement with the country to form a new legal entity. 7 A brownfield investment occurs

1

WORLD BANK GROUP, DATA AND STATISTICS (2002), available at http://www.worldbank.org
Id.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Brendan Vickers, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Regime in the Republic of South Africa. February 2002,
available at http://cuts.org/ifd-Im-c r-safrica.doc.
6
Id.
7
Id.
2

1

2
when foreign investors acquire an existing local company and completely replace all plant and
equipment of the former company. 8
The popularity of FDI may be because it has the propensity to create other positive economic
benefits by providing foreign exchange, employing citizens of the developing countries and
stimulating general economic growth. A positive effect of FDI on developing countries is the
international recognition gained as a result of their business interactions with developed
countries. Evidence of this was seen when Mexico entered into the NAFTA agreement with the
U.S. and Canada. 9
This paper will analyze U.S. FDI in three developing countries: South Africa, Malaysia and
Mexico. These countries were selected from three regions of the world: Africa, Latin America
and Asia. The selection is based on the uniqueness of their foreign investment policies, 10 and the
unique situations U.S. companies face in terms of FDI in these countries. 11 These three countries
are representative of the quest for FDI by all developing countries. Foreign investment policies
are designed to be unique documents that state the desire of a country to do business with
foreign-owned businesses; foreign investment policies may afford investors the opportunity to
discern all pertinent information and therefore must be drafted in ways that are comprehensible
and accessible. To attract investors to a country, most countries, particularly developing

8

Id.
North American Free Trade Agreement, drafted Aug. 12, 1992, revised Sept. 6, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M. at
605 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1994) (hereinafter NAFTA Agreement).
10
All three countries have achieved enviable success in attracting FDI, however their policy strategies have been
very different. Malaysia’s investment guide is still quite restrictive. Mexico’s foreign investment law has certain
facets from its 1917 Constitution. South Africa’s investment guide has few restrictions. These issues will be
addressed below. See p. 5, 25, and 53.
11
Though U.S. FDI is sought after by many countries, it has also created some controversy. This is evident in
Malaysia, Mexico and South Africa.
9
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countries, offer all kinds of incentives to the investors. 12 Other countries, however, may have
some very rigid foreign investment policies. 13 Though some rigidity in investment regulations is
acceptable, investments can be forfeited in extreme cases. Economic, political, social, and legal
situations of developing countries are key considerations for prospective U.S. investors.
Currently, political tension has reduced FDI inflows to the developing parts of the Middle East. 14
However, some developing countries in the Middle East may still be able to attract foreign
investors because of their oil and petroleum resources. Chapter 1 will form the beginning of
individual country analysis. The first country to be discussed is Malaysia. Chapters 2 and 3 will
focus respectively on FDI in Mexico and South Africa.
The analysis of U.S. FDI in each country will include a brief country profile as well as an
analysis of the historical evolution of U.S. foreign direct investment in these nations. In the
discussion on each country an analysis is made of factors that make each nation attractive to U.S.
companies. The discussion also addresses restrictions on foreign investors in these nations, the
effects of foreign direct investment on the citizens of these nations, and effects of foreign direct
investment on the economies of these nations. Recommendations will be made in the concluding
section of each individual country analysis.
Chapter 5 concludes with a general discussion of the regulatory problems affecting FDI
among developing countries in Africa, Latin America, Asia, and other parts of the world. The
discussion of FDI in certain regions includes other problems that may not be necessarily

12

Edward M. Graham, Forward to Louis T. Wells Jr ET AL., Using Tax Incentives to Compete for Foreign
Investment. Are they worth the costs? at vii, (World Bank Publications) (2001). Incentives may be given through
direct subsidies or indirect subsidies.
13
Some foreign investment laws are restrictive on foreign investors and have no room for flexibility.
14
World Bank Anticipates Global Upturn, Urges Increased Help to Poor Countries; Growth in the Middle East
Challenged by External Environment, World Bank News No. 2002/225/MNA. FDI inflows to developing countries
have been weak after the events of September 11th .

4
regulatory. Final comments and recommendations will be proposed on regulatory and other
measures developing countries may adopt to reap maximum benefits from FDI.
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CHAPTER 2
MALAYSIA
Though China actually gets the most FDI of any country in Asia, 15 Malaysia has
increasingly become a unique example of how effective well- formulated investment policies and
well-structured infrastructure can sustain the quest for FDI by developing countries. 16
A. Historical Evolution of U.S. FDI in Malaysia.
Traditionally, Malaysia’s source of economic growth was derived from public sector
investment 17 . The Malaysian government focused on revenue from commodities like rubber, tin,
and palm oil. Despite Malaysia’s reliance on this public sector investment, Malaysian
governments over the years exhibited their interest in extending investment to the private sector
by enacting the following investment related laws: The Income Tax Act 1967, 18 The Free Trade
Zone Act, No. 438 (1971), 19 the Industrial Coordination Act, No 156 (1975) 20 and the
Promotions of Investments Act, No. 327 (1986). Between 1971 and 1973, a recession occurred in
Malaysia because of a worldwide oil crisis. 21 This recession discouraged U.S. companies that
wanted to set up businesses in Malaysia from doing so. 22 Between 1980 and 1981 the Malaysian

15

A. T. Kearney, FDI Confidence Index, vol. 5 BUSINESS POLICY COUNCIL. 2 (2002) According to the index
report, China has also surpassed the U.S. to become the premier destination for foreign investment.
16
Id.
17
Terence P. Stewart, Png, L. H., The Growth Triangle of Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia, GA. J. INT’L &
COMP. L. Vol.23, 20 (1993).
18
It contains tax regulation and other incentives for certain stated sectors
19
It provides manufacturing investors with less customs control and bureaucracies in the export of raw materials,
machinery and equipment, spare parts and finished goods.
20
It provides coordination and organized investment for the activities of investors within the manufacturing
industry.
21
Ming-Yu Cheng, Sayed Hossain, Malaysia and the Asian Turmoil, 2 A SIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 5, 125 (2001)
22
Id.
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economy suffered again as a result of a commodity and second oil crisis. 23 In 1984, after the IMF
imposed strict loan conditions on Malaysia, FDI became its perceived key to economic
sustenance. 24 Malaysia’s reliance on the agricultural sector was negatively affected when Palm
oil, one of Malaysia’s main exports, became unpopular. 25 Malaysia has been the leading
producer of oil palm since 1988. 26 Malaysian export of palm oil to the U.S. grew from 1.7 in
1978 to 4.3% in 1986. 27 However, medical studies soon determined that palm could cause some
heart conditions. 28 Therefore, between 1985 and 1992, Malaysia concentrated on developing a
manufacturing industry for producing electrical gadgets. 29 This was soon affected by the
worldwide electronic crisis of 1985 and 1986 causing little demand for electronic products. 30 The
manufacturing industry in Malaysia therefore suffered when U.S. companies begun to lay
workers. 31
Political tensions between the majority Bumipatras and the minority Indians and Chinese
affected the country’s FDI attractiveness. This tensio n existed from colonial times when the
Chinese were considered the wealthier of the local people and the Indians were considered the
economic middleclass

32

while the majority Malays (Bumiputra’s) were at the bottom of the

economic wealth ladder, owning a miniscule equity from the country’s resources. 33 Also, the
Malaysian and U.S. relationship became strained when the Malaysian government refused to

23

Id.
Kent Klaudt, Hungary After the Revolution: Privatization, Economic Ideology and the False Promise of the Free
Market, 13 LAW & INEQ. J. 303, 307 (1995)
25
Howard Shapiro, Asian Economic Integration and the Growth Triangle, 4 INT’L LEGAL PERSP . 1, 4 (1992)
26
Stewart, supra note 17, at 21; see also report by STATISTICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RESEARCH AND
TRAINING CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC COUNTRIES (2002) available at
http://www.sesrtcic.org/members/link.shtml
27
Id.
28
Id. This situation affected the growth of the Palm oil industry.
29
Cheng, supra note 21, at 126.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Charles Hirschman, The Society and its Environment, in MALAYSIA: A COUNTRY STUDY, 67, 109
33
Id.
24
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allow Vietnamese boat people into the country. 34 The strain was increased in 1990 when the U.S.
government sanctioned Malaysia and prevented it from receiving International Military
Assistance and Training funds. 35 Between 1992 and 1996, U.S. and Malaysian business dealings
were not stable. 36 By 1993, foreign pledges in manufacturing declined and caused a loss of
nearly $2.5 billion. 37
By 1996, the manufacturing sector rebounded and pledged amounts reached $2 billion by
the first quarter of 1996. 38 However, Malaysia’s FDI setbacks were far from over. In 1998,
Malaysia suffered its most devastating economic shutdown dur ing the Asian economic crisis,
The Asian economic crisis started when Thailand’s currency, the Baht, floated internationally in
July 1997 39 . As a result of the Asian crisis, Malaysia's GDP dramatically changed from 2.5
percent in the first quarter to 6.8 percent by the second quarter. 40 Panic-stricken investors started
to pull out of short-term capital on a large scale. 41
The crisis prompted a sharp FDI decline in the tourism and agricultural sectors between
January 1997 and December 1998. 42 To worsen matters, in September 1998, Malaysia's Prime
Minister, Mahathir Mohamad, introduced controversial new controls on currency trading. 43 The
Malaysian Prime Minister introduced the new laws as a form of economic protectionism to
prevent foreign countries from manipulating Malaysian resources in the wake of the Asian

34

Shapiro, supra note 25, at 5
Id.
36
INTERNATIONAL EXECUTIVE REPORTS, LTD., INVESTING IN M ALAYSIA: CURRENT RULES, INCENTIVES,
REQUIREMENTS 13 (1996) (hereinafter 18 NO. 7 E. A SIAN EXECUTIVE REP . 13)
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Cheng, supra note 21, at 127
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id, at 130
43
BBC News, Malaysia Lifts Foreign Investment Controls (May 2, 2001), available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/English/business/newsid_1308000/1308240.stm.
35
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crisis. 44 The new controls required foreign investors to keep their money in Malaysia for a year.
The Malaysian government also demanded that all foreign holdings of the Malaysian currency be
liquidated and repatriated to Malaysia within a month of receipt. 45 These factors made Malaysia
unattractive for FDI.
B. Reasons why Malaysia is Attractive for FDI.
After the recession, Malaysia’s economy rebounded in 1999 growing 5.6 percent. Major
factors for this growth were the low level of reserves, little foreign debt and the continuity of the
manufacturing and export sector. 46 By this time, the focus changed to foreign export and foreign
investment. 47 The manufacturing sector in Malaysia became the government's key asset in its
quest for foreign investment. 48 FDI was promoted in export-oriented manufacturing and hightech industries. 49 Some of the reasons that make Malaysia attractive are its undervalued
currency, low cost of labor, and fairly low inflation rate. 50 Foreign investors have four options
for investing in Malaysia: (1) Registering as a foreign company, (2) Incorporating as a separate
company in Malaysia, (3) Forming a sole proprietorship or (4) A partnership or a joint venture
company with a local company. 51 Technically any foreign company having a place of business
or carrying on a business in Malaysia may register itself as a foreign company and directors
meetings must be held in Malaysia. 52

44

Id.
Id. These measures received a lot of criticism worldwide because they did not correspond with orthodox financial
and IMF trade practices. Ultimately the measures introduced by the Malaysian Prime Minister caused foreign
investors to shun Malaysia.
46
Mustapha Kamil, Battle to Safeguard Independence, NEW STRAIT TIMES, August 31, 1999, at A1
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, NATIONAL TRADE DATA BANK, September 3 (1999)
50
Bently J. Anderson, Venture Capital and Securities Market Development in Malaysia: The Search for a
Functioning Exit Mechanism, 12 W IS. INT’L L.J. 1, 12 (1993)
51
Stewart, supra note 17, at 22.
52
Id.
45
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Though Malaysia’s gets a lot of foreign investors from other Asian countries like Japan,
the U.S. companies rank first in FDI in Malaysia. 53 Some of the U.S. investors are large
multinationals like Boeing, General Electric, R.J Reynolds, and Bechtel. A positive effect of the
influx of U.S. investors to Malaysians is tha t, customers have access to after-sales service and
follow-up services and this is very much valued by Malaysians. 54
Malaysia’s FDI appeal also stems from Malaysia’s National Economic Program
(NERP). 55 Malaysia plans to become an industrialized nation by the year 2020; this quest is
referred to as Malaysia’s “Vision 2020”. 56 The six objectives to promote economic growth under
this plan are:57 (1) Stabilizing the Ringgit (Malaysia’s national currency), (2) Restoring market
confidence, (3) Maintaining market stability, (4) Strengthening economic fundamentals, (5)
Furthering the socio-economic agenda and (6) Reviving badly affected sectors. Though Malaysia
is still facing tough economic situations, the idea of having a plan has been very appealing to
foreign investors because Malaysia seems to be relentlessly pursuing the plan by producing
equipment that is in high demand 58 .
Malaysia is currently recognized as one of the world’s largest exporter of integrated
circuits and other semiconductor devices. 59 The multimedia super corridor (MSC) is Malaysia’s
blueprint for developing a high-technology information-based research and manufacturing
region. 60 Investments approved for MSC status are exempt from currency exchange and

53

Dr Mahathir Mohamad, Address at the U.S.-ASEAN Business Council Dinner (May 14, 2002).
Id.
55
Cheng, supra note 21, at 133.
56
NATIONAL ECONOMIC ACTION COUNCIL (NEAC), NATIONAL ECONOMIC RECOVERY PLAN
(NERP) (August 1998) available at http://www.neac.gov
57
Id.
58
Stewart, supra note 17, at 21.
59
Id.
60
Chris Wong, Malaysia’s MSC and Intellectual Property Protection, Jaring Internet Magazine, 1 (August 1999)
available at http://www.mdc.com.my/
54
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expatriate employment restrictions. 61 The Malaysian government is determined to develop the
MSC to generate more export and investment opportunities for U.S. high-technology firms. 62
Foreign companies that are granted MSC status are also permitted 100% ownership of their
companies. 63
Like the U.S., Malaysia’s legal system is founded on the common law system. This is the
legal system the Malaysians inherited from the British. Since the U.S. has the same legal system,
U.S. investors have a better understanding and appreciation for Malaysian laws and this is crucial
to the handling of their business activities in the country. Fortunately for foreign investors, there
are many professional legal firms in Malaysia and it is prudent for U.S. companies that wish to
reside in Malaysia to secure the services of local lawyers.
Malaysia is also a signatory to the United Nations sponsored Convention on the
Settlement of Investment Disputes. 64 Therefore foreign investment disputes are satisfactorily
handled by existing dispute mechanisms. 65 Though many foreign firms may choose to include
mandatory arbitration clauses in their contacts, foreign investment disputes are rare in
Malaysia. 66 Malaysia has also instituted effective and enforceable laws within the legal system to
assure foreign direct investors of the protection of their property. 67 Foreigners are freely
permitted to own lands that are not considered agricultural land and residential property that is
valued at less than $ 62,500. 68

61

Id.
Id.
63
The Industrial Co-ordination Act, No. 156 (1975)
64
18 NO. 7 E.A SIAN EXECUTIVE REP , supra note 36, at 16
65
Id.
66
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 2001 COUNTRY COMMERCIAL GUIDE: MALAYSIA (2001)
67
Id.
68
Id
62
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Until the recent competition from China, 69 Malaysia had a strong information technology
(I.T.) base. The Malaysian government instituted a very effective legal structure to protect
intellectual property rights. 70 The Malaysian government has set up an Anti-Corruption Agency
(ACA) to prevent corruption by officials and foreign businesses are asked to report any
individuals who ask for payment in return for government services. 71 This is a positive action by
the government to attract foreign investors.
U.S. business visitors to Malaysia do not require visas for a three-month entry unless
they are in Malaysia for the purpose of employment. This gives potential U.S. foreign direct
investors the chance to go to Malaysia for three months to explore possible business
opportunities with no visa restrictions. 72
The Malaysian government has eased political tension by promoting the holding of
economic assets by the Bumiputra (ethnic Malays). 73 This move by the Malaysian government is
a good political and social strategy because it resolves political unrest between the Bumiputra
and the other Malays. Malaysia has also shown signs of its desire to evolve into a strong
financial market within Asia by entering into agreements with neighboring countries; a
prominent agreement is the “The growth Triangle” agreement, which was designed to facilitate
economic growth and development in Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia 74 .

69

Kearney, supra note 15, at 21. After China joined the WTO, it has made great strides in obtaining FDI. More I.T.
companies are setting up manufacturing bases in China and there seem to be more Chinese students in U.S. schools
pursuing post-graduate degrees in I.T. related subjects.
70
Trade Description Act, No. 291(1972), Patent Act of 1983, Patent Regulations Act, No. A648 (1986), Industrial
Designs Act, No. 552 (1996), Copyright Act, No. 322 (1987), Intellectual Property Corporation of Malaysia Act
(2002).
71
Id
72
MALAYSIAN INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, available at http://www.mida.gov.my/
73
The Industrial Co-ordination Act 1975, every foreign and domestic company must have a 30 percent Bumiputra
workforce.
74
Stewart, supra note 17, at 1, This idea of an economically unified partnership between Singapore, Malaysia and
Indonesia was originally proposed by Singapore Deputy Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong in December 1989; a
trilateral agreement was finally formed on the 17th December 1994, available at http://www.cmsb.com.my/
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1. The Growth Triangle of Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia.
This agreement is a strategic partnership among the three countries to complement each
other’s resources and potential while ensuring their individual growth. 75 Because the three
countries have different but complementary stages of development, the “Growth Triangle” will
also offer investors a chance to benefit from FDI derived from three countries at the same time.
This is because sectors that are covered under the agreement could expand the geographical area
for investor activity, creating huge FDI opportunities for investors. 76 Though the three
governments try to coordinate their investment regimes and other economic policies to meet the
requirements of the private sector, each country still maintains its own investment regime and
laws. 77
Malaysia has key contributions to the growth triangle. 78 One of Malaysia’s cities,
Labuan, was named the “International Offshore Financial Center” (IOFC)79 because of its wealth
in oil and gas. The city has literally become a tax haven for foreign investment because of its
very relaxed tax laws. 80 Malaysia also has cheap labor, land and a good manufacturing industry
to offer. Ultimately benefits accruing from Malaysia’s involvement in the growth triangle may
enhance the countries’ attractiveness to U.S. investors.
2. Other Agreements.
Malaysia has bilateral investment guarantee agreements with 56 countries. 81 The first
bilateral investment agreement was with the U.S. in 1959. 82 Malaysia also has a limited

75

Id.
Id.
77
Id, at 25.
78
Id.
79
Id, at 24
80
Id.
81
MINISTRY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INDUSTRY, MALAYSIA’S INDIVIDUAL ACTION
PLAN, available at http://www.miti.gov.my
82
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, supra note 66
76
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investment guarantee agreement with the U.S. under the U.S. Overseas Private Investment
Corporation (OPIC) program. Since 1959, Malaysia has qualified for the OPIC insurance
programs. Due to the stable political system in the country and pro-foreign investor attitude, few
investors have needed OPIC insurance in Malaysia. 83
3. Promotions and Investments Act 1986.
Foreign investment in Malaysia has historically been safer than in other developing Asian
countries. Malaysia’s investment policy provides many incentives to foreign investors. The
principle investment incentives are contained in the Promotion of Investments Act 1986 and the
Income Tax Act 1967. 84 This act covers companies intending to undertake activities in
manufacturing, agriculture, tourism, research and development and technical or vocational
training. The tax incentives under this Act relating to direct foreign investment are: (1) Income
tax exemption or investment tax allowance through Pioneer Status and (2) Double deduction for
export expenses. 85 Pioneer status is a prime status for investors. Companies granted this status
either enjoy full or partial exemption from income tax depending on the activities they
undertake. Currently the income tax rate in Malaysia is 30%. 86 Therefore, companies qualifying
for this status immediately increase the rate of return on their investments. 87
High-tech companies engaged in promoted activities or in the production of promoted
areas in new and emerging technologies are granted full tax exemption at the statutory income
level for 5 years or a 60 percent tax allowance on qualifying capital expenditure incurred within

83

Id.
n.18.
85
Sec. A1
86
INVESTORS’ GUIDE, 1, extracted from The Economic Report 1995/96
87
Sec. A1 (i), A company given pioneer status for producing promoted product or activity will be exempted on 70
percent of its statutory income. The grace period of tax exemption is 5 years beginning from the production day.
Companies already located in promoted areas are granted 85 percent exemption where it will have to pay tax on 15
percent of their statutory income for 5 years
84

14
5 years. 88 Strategic projects of national importance involving heavy capital investments, high
technology, the ability to generate extensive linkages and having a significant impact on the
Malaysian economy are granted full income tax exemption for 10 years or an investment tax
allowance of 100 percent on qualifying capital expenditure incurred within 5 years. 89 Subsidiary
research and development services enjoy full exemption from payment of income tax for 5 years.
Any incurred losses are added up and deferred to the post tax relief period. An alternative to this
is a 100 percent tax allowance in respect of qualifying capital expenditure incurred within 10
years. 90 A final tax incentive attempts to offset export expenses by allowing tax deductions. 91
Some export expenses that are incurred by foreign investors in Malaysia on manufactured
products and agricultural produc e are eligible for double deduction. 92
Malaysia has also encouraged FDI through privatization and generous limits on foreign
equity ownership. Generally, foreign direct investors established in Malaysia are accorded
national treatment in all but equity limits. 93 In addition Malaysia has temporarily eased equity
restrictions on foreign ownership of licensed telecommunications companies. 94 Foreign
ownership in local fund management companies has been raised to 70% for companies working
with both institutional and unit trust funds and foreign ownership in stock-brokering companies
was allowed to reach a maximum of 49% by June 30, 1998. 95 Malaysia has Free Zones in which
88

Sec. A1 (ii)
Sec A1 (iii)
90
Sec A1 (iv), These tax benefits create significant incentives for foreign companies to invest in Malaysia
91
Sec. A2, by providing double deductions for these expenses, the Malaysian government shifts most of the export
expenses of qualifying companies to itself.
92
Sec. A2 (i) Overseas training, (ii) supply of free samples abroad, (iii) export market research, (iv) preparation of
tenders for the supply of goods overseas, (vi) public relations work connected with exports, (vii) exhibits and/or
participation in local or international trade or industrial exhibitions approved by the Minister of International Trade
and Industry, (viii) employee fare expenses for overseas, (ix) expenditure by Malaysian businessmen overseas
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export-oriented manufacturing and warehousing facilities may be established. Raw materials and
equipment may be imported duty- free into the zones with minimum custom formalities. 96
Companies that export not less than 80% of their output and depend on imported goods may be
located in these zones. 97 The manifold ways in which Malaysia is attractive for FDI is seen
through: (1) Its action to curb corruption, (2) A legal structure similar to the U.S., (3) An
English-speaking business community, (4) Geographic alliances that attract capital, (5) Financial
incentives through favorable tax treatment, (6) Encouraged foreign participation in privatizations
and, (7) A more generous equity ownership.
C. Factors that Hinder FDI in Malaysia.
The Malaysian government retains considerable discretionary authority over individual
investments. 98 Foreign investors who seek to invest in Malaysia must seek the approval of the
Malaysian Investment Development Authority (MIDA). 99 Approval depends on several factors:
(1) The size of the investment, (2) Percent of local equity participation, (3) The type of financing
(both local and offshore) required, (4) Capital/labor ratio, (5) The ability of planned and existing
infrastructure to support the effort and, (6) The existence of a local or foreign market for the
output. 100
Proposals for a manufacturing license, either foreign or local, are screened by the MIDA
to determine whether they are consistent with the Second Industrial Master Plan and government
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strategic and social policies. 101 The approval process is frustrating for potential investors.
Investment is also restricted in the oil and gas industry. The oil and gas industry is under the
supervision of the Petroleum National Board and this board has legal title to Malaysian crude oil
and gas deposits. 102 The general investment policy limits foreign equity to a minority 30 percent
share 103 . In certain cases, foreign firms selling their products to the domestic market have
received licenses limited exactly to the 30 percent minority share. 104
When the licenses of foreign firms expire, the Malaysian government requires these firms
to demo nstrate substantial progress towards meeting the foreign equity limits. These
performance requirements are often written into the manufacturing license of both local and
foreign investors. 105 A foreign company can lose any tax benefits it may have been awarded if it
fails to meet the terms of its license. 106 According to the Foreign Investment Guideline of 1974,
private entities both local and foreign can acquire, merge and take over businesses; however the
acquisition or disposal of 5% or more of the interests in any local financial institution requires
the prior approval of the Minister of Finance. 107
It can be frustrating for foreign companies to obtain work permits for their employees.
Though such permits are eventually obtained, the process can be time-consuming. Approval
must first be obtained from the appropriate Ministries and then forwarded to the Immigration
Department for issuance of the required documents. 108 Additionally, many foreign firms face
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restrictions in the number of foreign workers they are allowed to employ. 109 This is to ensure that
foreign companies employ Malaysian workers. In order to restrict foreign equity, The Malaysian
government requires investors to hire up to 30% Bumiputra partners and have a workforce that
reflects Malaysia’s ethnic composition. 110 This forces foreign companies who prefer to have
skilled workers from their countries to employ Malaysian nationals.
D. Negative Impact of FDI on Malaysia.
Malaysia has experienced some human right violations from U.S. investors in the
manufacturing sector. 111 Malaysia’s lack of a minimum wage for this sector 112 may be a
contributory factor for these violations. This may be in violation of the International Labor
Convention, which requires all cities to establish a minimum wage. 113 However, some U.S.
investors took advantage of this problem causing certain Malaysians to suffer hardships and
abuses from them. 114
The Malaysian government has been criticized for failure to enforce workplace health or
safety laws. 115 Workers employed by foreign-owned electronic companies sometimes work in
deplorable conditions. Situations have been reported where huge electronic industries lacked
proper ventilation and workers were subjected to various forms of health hazards. 116 In the early
1980s, many Malaysian women working in electronic factories began to experience
hallucinations and seizures; this particularly happened after standing for long hours on the
109
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assembly line in electronic industries. 117 In most developing countries, international labor
standards are not really enforced and institutions set up to observe companies do not work
efficiently. 118 American companies investing in Malaysia have been criticized as for being the
worst violators of workers rights in Malaysia. 119 Some American electronic firms in the past
banned union brochures and pamphlets from the work place. 120 In 1986, General Instrument
Corporation warned the Malaysian Minister of Labor that if the local employees ever formed a
union the corporation would sell its optic-electronic business and close down the Malaysian
Plant. 121
Ironically several American labor groups; protested against the Malaysian government’s
apathy, and pushed to have industrial workers form trade unions at their work places. 122 These
groups complained that the limitation on workers to form unions was a violation of U.S.
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) requirements. 123
E. Recommendation.
The Malaysian economy is somewhat vulnerable. FDI inflow is steadily decreasing
annually because China is now posing as a serious competitor; it has a large domestic market, it
is seriously liberalizing its FDI regime, it has wealth in skilled and unskilled manpower, it has
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low labor costs compared to Malaysia. 124 There are certain drastic measures that Malaysia needs
to take; some of the bureaucratic measures employed in the FDI process must be done away
with. If such steps are taken and enforced, the hurdle investor’s face will be cleared. Also, the
Malaysian governments’ ambitious stake of $10 billion for the development of the MSC program
has not yielded much attraction to foreign investors 125 . $10 billion is an exorbitant sum of money
that could have been used to enhance other areas that clearly attract foreign investors. The fact
that Malaysia has gained world wide recognition for its high- tech industries does not mean the
government should invest so heavily in the relatively new MSC project.
In recent times, Malaysia has steadily increased its labor cost; the country increased its
levy on companies 126 that hire foreign workers causing some of those investors to leave. This
labor costs were increased as a solution to the unemployment problem in the country and also the
specific problem of unskilled professionals. Malaysia needs to reduce the high labor costs in
order to compete with rival China. Malaysia’s solution to unskilled was to refuse to renew the
work permits of foreign investors; this is not a solution to the problem, rather it creates
unattractiveness to foreign direct investors. Perhaps, Malaysia needs to embark on a more
liberalized investment regime to come back into FDI picture. Ultimately foreign investors will
not come back to Malaysia because of incentives that are no longer admirable, unless these
primary problems are addressed.
Another measure that can be employed to increase technological shills among Malaysian
workers is to provide special incentives for domestic companies that train their workers on
modern technology. Malaysia needs to modify its investment incentives such that special
124
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provision will be included to entire technological companies from industrialized countries to set
up either manufacturing bases in the country or to form coalitions with Malaysian institutions to
increase technological know- how. Instead of its direct dependency on FDI, Malaysia should
concentrate on developing new industries for their individual growth and not solely for purposes
of FDI inflow. If such a change in attitude is adopted, there would be a rapid industrial
advancement in the country and this will ultimately lead to a growth in FDI.
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CHAPTER 3
MEXICO.
Mexico rapidly seems to be emerging as an economic trailblazer for Latin American
developing countries. Recent Mexican governments have encouraged growth in the private
sector and reduced the number of state-owned enterprises in efforts to woo foreign investors into
the country. 127 Though U.S. investors have presently set up businesses in Mexico, it is clear from
Mexico’s history that this was not always the case because U.S. FDI in Mexico was not always
as stable as it seems today.
A. Historical Evolution of U.S. FDI in Mexico.
It was under the administration of President Porfirio Diaz, that FDI first gained
prominence in Mexico. 128 President Diaz’s foreign investment policies were structured around
the exportation of primary goods. 129 Throughout his thirty- four year tenure in office, President
Diaz and his ruling party called “Cientificos” established an economic liberalism similar to
Mexico’s present day free market economy. 130 This economic liberalism encouraged the free
flow of foreign capital and FDI into Mexico. 131 U.S. and other foreign investors were investing
in the mineral, commerce, real estate, banking, railroad construction and manufacturing
industries of Mexico. 132
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special infrastructure for only foreign investors and not Mexican nationals. By the end of the
Diaz administration, over half of Mexico’s wealth was believed to be owned by foreign
investors. 133 The Mexican people accused the Diaz government of selling off Mexico to foreign
investors. 134 The unhappiness with the Diaz’s administration and the realization that many
businesses in Mexico were foreign-owned created social and political unrest. 135 U.S. FDI in
Mexico also became unstable because President Diaz was having some political trouble with the
U.S. government. 136 There remained widespread poverty and huge income disparity between the
upper class and lower class Mexicans. 137 All of these factors contributed to the Mexican
revolution of 1910. 138
The Mexican revolutionaries 139 basically dismantled the role of the state prior to the
revolution and set up a new state role. 140 The 1917 Mexican Constitution141 clearly limited the
wide powers of the state to make foreign investment policies that only benefited foreigners. 142
The new Constitution was very nationalistic in nature. 143
FDI in Mexico suffered as a result of the 1910 Revolution. However, the petroleum industry still
thrived mainly because most of the oil companies were located in parts of Mexico that suffered
few effects of the revolution. 144 Due to the oil companies, U.S. FDI in Mexico increased from
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$616 million in 1911 to $683 million in 1929. 145

Prior to the 1917 Constitution, U.S. oil

companies predominantly owned the petroleum industry in Mexico. 146 However, Article 27 of
the 1917 Mexican Constitution vested all Mexican natural resources in its government, 147
therefore U.S. ownership of petroleum land was threatened. 148 U.S. oil companies therefore
sought the help of the U.S. government and eventually reached an agreement with the Mexican
government to protect foreign property and also ensure compensation for any foreign-owned
land already confiscated. 149
Victory for U.S. oil companies was short- lived when the new administration of President
Lazaro Cardenas 150 nationalized the oil industry. 151 This generated a boycott of Mexican oil by
U.S. petroleum companies. 152 Efforts by the U.S. government to get just compensation were
refused. 153 Mexico was not very interested in FDI under the Cardenas administration. However,
Mexico once again demonstrated its need for FDI under the administration of President Avila
Camacho from 1940 through 1946.154 This administration introduced the economic development
model known as “import substituting industrialization” (ISI). 155 This model was used as a
measure to encourage foreign investment in Mexican manufacturing and reduce Mexican
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dependence of the on foreign imports. 156 President Camacho also issued the Emergency Decree
of 1944 that placed restrictions on the “creation, modification, liquidation and the transfer of
Mexican stock”. This Decree was a nationalistic effort aimed at maintaining control over
Mexican assets. 157 Unfortunately for U.S. investors, local businessmen also felt threatened by the
growth of FDI and lodged complaints with the government. 158 In response, the Mexican
government discriminated against foreign investors in the award of business permits and
contracts. 159 This problem continued from 1964 through 1970 during the administration of
President Gustavo Diaz Ordaz. 160
During the Ordaz administration, however, more U.S. companies invested in Mexico.
Two restrictions on foreign investors eliminated:161 (1) The requirement that sought to prevent
foreign companies from investing in restricted industries through holding companies and, (2)
The elimination of fertilizers, insecticides, food and chemical products from the “Mexicanization
list” that was sent up by predecessor, President Lopes Mateos between 1958 and 1965.
1. The 1973 FIL and FDI in Mexico.
The Law to Promote the Mexican Investment and Regulate Foreign Investment (1973
FIL) 162 was enacted during the administration of President Luis Echeverria. 163 The 1973 FIL
emphasized the economic sovereignty of Mexico and also set out broad powers of the
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government on foreign investment issues. 164 In effect, the 1973 FIL was a defensive measure that
exhibited the growing mistrust of foreign investors in Mexico and the need to rebuild Mexican
economic sovereignty. 165 Certain key provisions were incorporated into the 1973 FIL: (1)
Cessation of foreign ownership by sector or region, (2) Foreign Investment to serve as a
complement to Mexican investment ideals and, (3) The association of foreign investment with
domestic capital on a minority basis. 166
The National Commission of Foreign Investment (FIC) was set up to implement the 1973
FIL and supervise foreign investment. 167 The 1973 FIL established a regulatory scheme that
required majority Mexican involvement in many economic activities and industries. 168 Foreign
investment participation was also limited to forty- nine percent in new business that had not been
regulated by the government. 169 The 1973 FIL also established a bureaucratic policy that
required government approval if transfer of management was made to a foreign investor or
foreign investments exceeded twenty- five percent of equity or more than forty- nine percent of
the fixed assets of a company that already existed. 170
Another provision in the 1973 FIL required all new businesses and existing foreign
companies in Mexico to register with the National Registry of Foreign investment. (FIR)171
While the FIR had the discretion to increase the maximum forty- nine percent foreign investment
164
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limitation if the investment area was important to Mexico, the exception was rarely granted. 172
These provisions in the 1973 FIL all affected the inflow of FDI into Mexico. 173
2. Mexico’s Brief Economic Boom and Subsequent Crisis.
President Jose Lopez Portillo 174 was the successor to President Echeverria. During his
administration, Mexico became a major petroleum-producer. Large petroleum deposits were
found in the Tabasco and Chiapas provinces and in the Gulf of Mexico in the late 1970s.175
These petroleum discoveries were so significant that production from petroleum tripled and
income from petroleum sales increased from $500 million in 1976 to $6 billion in 1980. 176
Petroleum sales, controlled by PEMEX, the state-owned oil company, were expected to provide
domestic funds for investment and relieve the economy from the need for foreign investment. 177
Mexico did not allow much FDI during this period because the domestic economy was
faring well without the help of investment by foreign companies. 178 The only FDI that continued
during this period was in the Maquiladoras assembly, an export assembly plant with foreign
ownership exempted from the requirement of FIC approval. 179 External debts and rising oil
prices created an economic crisis for Mexico in 1982. This economic crisis caused U.S. and other
foreign investors in Mexico to withdraw their money from Mexican banks. 180
In response to the gradual depletion of its foreign reserves, President Portillo put a freeze
on all foreign reserves and converted them to devalued pesos. 181 This move destroyed investor
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confidence and caused massive removal of capital from Mexico. 182 Because of this problem, FDI
in Mexico was quite minimal by the time President de la Madrid took office in 1982. 183
In 1984 the Mexican government issued foreign investment guidelines. 184 Because the
guidelines were not substantive law, foreign investors remained skeptical until the enactment of
the 1989 Foreign Investment Regulation

185

that U.S. foreign direct investors regained their

confidence to invest in Mexico once again.
3. 1989 Foreign Investment Regulation (1989 FIR).
Mexico’s present foreign investment policies predominantly evolved from administrative
declarations rather than from the enactment of new legislations. 186 The 1989 FIR was enacted by
virtue of the powers given to President Carlos Salinas de Gortari187 under Article 89 of the
Mexican Constitution. 188 The 1989 foreign investment regulation modified the restrictive
policies of the 1973 FIL but not the entire act. 189 In a broad sense the 1989 regulations govern
the following: (1) Foreign investment activity in opening new businesses, (2) Acquiring
companies that already exist in Mexico, (3) Expanding the scope of existing foreign investment,
(4) Clarify and liberalize rules on foreign investment within restricted zones. 190 All of these
provisions were designed to encourage foreign investment.
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Initial foreign investment response to the 1989 regulation was slow because of uncertainty
over the constitutionality of the regulations. 191 Gradually U.S. investors gained confidence in the
regulations; between late 1979 and early 1990, FDI from U.S. industrial companies was $11.6
billion. 192 . Both countries clearly enjoyed the advantages provided by FDI during this period and
this caused more U.S. investors to be more interested in Mexico. Mexico definitely has the
propensity to attract more U.S. investors to the country.
B. Reasons why Mexico is Attractive for FDI.
In spite of Mexico’s infamous FDI history, U.S. companies continue to do business in
Mexico; as of April 16, 2002, there were approximately 2,600 American companies with
operations in Mexico. 193 Although Mexico receives average foreign investment on a global level,
the country is one of the largest recipients of general FDI outflow among developing
countries. 194
U.S. investors are centrally located in the manufacturing and financial sectors. 195
Mexico’s long-standing Maquiladora industry was set up by U.S. investors in 1965, 196 also major
U.S. telecom businesses like AT& T, SBC, COFETEL and MCI are active in Mexico. The
NAFTA agreement, 1993 FIL, 1998 FIL and other considerations of infrastructure are the
reasons for persistent U.S. foreign direct investment in Mexico.
191
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1. The NAFTA agreement.
On December 17, 1992, the United States, Mexico and Canada entered into a trade
agreement known as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). 197 NAFTA is aimed
at eliminating trade barriers to the flow of North American goods and services and investment;
encouraging enforcement of intellectual property rights; and setting up dispute resolution
procedures. 198 Chapter eleven of the NAFTA agreement specifically relates to foreign
investment. 199 Although U.S. companies have always engaged in FDI in Mexico, the NAFTA
agreement is unique to Mexico in that Mexico, a developing country, was able to enter into an
important trade agreement with two developed countries. Since 1994, the majority of Mexico’s
FDI has originated from U.S. investors. 200 NAFTA permits U.S. automotive manufacturers in
Mexico to import U.S. produced parts for use in their Mexican factories. 201 NAFTA also led to
an increase in U.S. food processing companies in Mexico. 202 NAFTA creates significant
employment opportunities for the Mexican people. 203 One of the important provisions in the
NAFTA agreement is that foreign investors will be treated without any discrimination. 204
As a goodwill measure, President Salinas modified Article 27 of the Mexican
Constitution to protect foreign investors against government expropriation of land and provided
for compensation to foreign investors who had been dispossessed of their property. 205 NAFTA
197
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eliminated performance requirements and the reservation of minimum equity and top
management positions for only Mexican nationals. 206 NAFTA also provides a mechanism for the
settlement of investment disputes in subchapter B of Chapter 11. 207

Although investment

disputes are not common in Mexico, the NAFTA agreement seeks to provide grounds for the
amicable settlement of investment disputes. 208 The idea that industrialized countries like Canada
and the U.S. are willing to enter into an investment agreement (NAFTA) with Mexico may cause
investors from other industrialized countries to also consider investing in Mexico.
2. The 1993 Foreign Investment Law. 209
Regulations that were made by the Salinas administration in 1989 were codified into the
1993 FIL and this law was structured to match the provisions of the NAFTA agreement. 210 The
Salinas government used the 1993 FIL to cure the controversy that stemmed from the 1989
regulations and the anti- friendly foreign investment policies of the 1973 FIL. 211 The 1993 FIL
provided a broad scope for foreign investment and simplified the processes of registering foreign
companies. 212 The 1993 FIL was instrumental in attracting more U.S. investors because it
addressed foreign investor concerns. First, it repealed a provision of the 1973 FIL that limited
foreign investment ownership to a minority position in the capital stock of Mexican
companies. 213 Second, the performance requirements contained in the 1973 FIL 214 were limited
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to just a few by the 1993 FIL. 215 These are: (1) How the investment was going to impact the
employment sector and how much training would be given to the employees of the foreign
business; (2) How the project impacted technology in Mexico; (3) The project satisfied
environmental laws set by ecological ordinances; (4) The project basically conformed to
Mexico’s goals of economic advancement. The 1993 FIL removed restrictions on fo reign
exchange that were imposed to exercise governmental control under the Portillo
administration. 216 Finally, the 1993 FIL also lessened the restricted zone limitation on real estate
acquisition by foreign investors. 217 U.S. investors can also seek permission from the Ministry of
Foreign Relation to acquire residential property through the aid of a Mexican trust. 218
3. The 1998 Foreign Investment Regulations.219
In 1998, Mexico once again improved on its foreign investment laws by enacting new the
1998 regulations. The 1998 regulations supplemented the 1993 Foreign Investment Act
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by

expanding, clarifying and matching the substance of the 1993 FIL. 221 The1998 FIR relaxed the
restriction on the acquisition of real estate by foreign investors and allowed them to own
property along land that was reserved by the Mexican government for national purposes. 222 The
provisions of the 1998 regulation also serve as legal backing for the administration of the
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National Commission of Foreign Investments, The National Registry of Foreign Investments and
the formation and incorporation of Mexican corporations. 223
4. Other Factors Attracting U.S. FDI in Mexico.
Foreign investors have the option of entering into general or limited partnerships. 224
Foreign investors can also enter into joint venture contracts with domestic partners. 225 Joint
venture contracts allow foreign investors to have better interaction with labor unions; this
removes any concerns of labor exploitation. 226 Most U.S. foreign investors are enticed by
Mexico’s cheap labor market. 227 To the advantage of foreign investors, Mexican governments
allegedly form alliances with trade unions to suit foreign direct investor needs. 228 U.S. investors
are particularly enthralled with the location advantages of being next door to Mexico. It is easy
for U.S. companies to set up offices or relocate to Mexico. The enactment of the 1991 Law for
the Promotion and Protection of Industrial Property and amendment in the copyright law 229 is a
sign that the Mexico sees the need for technological growth and this is attractive to foreign
investors.
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The political situation in Mexico is fairly stable and political violence and uprisings in
Mexico fairly limited because activities of the Zapatista National Liberation Army, The Popular
Revolutionary Army and the Revolutionary Army of the People’s Insurgency are mainly
confined to the southern states of Mexico and not prime FDI areas like Mexico City, Guadalajara
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and Monterrey. 231 The Mexican government has also instituted measures to combat
corruption. 232 Besides NAFTA, Mexico has a bilateral investment agreement with seventeen
other countries. 233 Mexico has entered into free trade agreements with thirty-two countries
including the European Union.
C. Factors that Hinder FDI in Mexico.
Articles 27 and 28 of the 1917 Constitution have remained giving power to the
government to regulate foreign investment in Mexico. 234 Article 27 235 sets out three restrictions
to foreign direct investors in Mexico: (1) National sovereignty over national resources,

236

(2)

The “Calvo Clause”237 requiring foreign investors to agree to be bound by Mexican law, not to
appeal to their own governments for foreign protection, and to forfeit property if agreements are
abrogated

238

and (3) The “restricted Zone” clause limiting land ownership. 239 Mexico’s energy

industry is Constitutionally reserved for the state because PEMEX continues to monopolize the
exploration and production of gas and oil. 240 This prevents U.S. petroleum companies from
owning oil companies in Mexico as they did during the administration of President Diaz. 241
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The Mexican legal system is based on civil law and therefore strictly based on enacted
codes, unlike the U.S. legal system that is based on common law and based on enacted codes and
the principle of precedents. 242 Under Mexican law whe n damages cannot be quantified in terms
of money, injunctive relief is unavailable. In the U.S. an injunctive relief is very common in
commercial disputes. 243 The Mexican civil code allows limited damages in civil cases, while
U.S. law allows unlimited civil damages and jurisdictional issues are also very different. 244 U.S.
foreign investors need to retain Mexican lawyers so they can be briefed on these differences
before they set up in Mexico.
There still remains a great deal of bureaucracy in Mexico; the National Foreign
Investment Commission must determine within forty-five days whether investments within
restricted areas should be allowed. 245 All businesses with foreign ownership must register with
the Secretariat of Commerce and Industrial Development within 40 days after being set up, even
if its operations do not require formal authorization. 246 Before the business commences, tax
registration must be done with the Registro Federal de Contribuyentes. 247 The Secretariat of
Foreign Relations has the duty of issuing permits to foreign investors to establish or change the
nature of already existing Mexican companies. 248 Foreign investors must first seek authorization
from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to incorporate a business in Mexico. 249 U.S. foreign
investors can also establish branches or subsidiaries of a company by complying with certain
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procedures including seeking authorization from the Foreign Investment Commission. 250 These
factors hinder FDI attractiveness in Mexico.
D. Effect of FDI on Mexico.
Due to Mexico’s inclusion in the NAFTA agreement, trade with the U.S. and other
countries have greatly increased over the years. 251 Unfortunately, Mexico seems to rely a lot on
its trade with U.S. investors and sometimes overlooks the needs of its local investors. If this
continues, local investors may call for nationalistic policies such as those introduced in the past.
E. Recommendation.
Mexico needs to assure investors that in times of economic crisis, it will not resort to
making the same impulsive laws and decisions that historically affected its FDI inflow. Since
252

Mexico enjoys a steady flow of U.S. FDI, it needs to consider lowering labor costs like China

has done. Educational standards should be raised to produce more skilled workers. The Mexican
government needs to address its immigration problems because if people continue to migrate
from Mexico into the U.S., there will be a problem of limited manpower. This could cause
Mexico to lose some potential investors to other countries with large workforces.
Mexico needs to consider reducing the number of governmental agencies that handle the
initial aspects of setting up a foreign business in the country. While it is necessary to have a
system to ensure that foreign-owned businesses are properly established, it is tedio us and
unattractive for direct foreign investors to seek approval for every specific action from different
agencies. The Mexican government and the trade unions also need to address the problem of
labor laws being abused by foreign investors. Regulations and penalties should be enacted and
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Id. On a global scale, Mexico gained a lot of respect and recognition after the NAFTA agreement because
developing countries started looking up to Mexico and other developed countries wanted to do business with
Mexico
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enforced on to prevent the abuse of labor laws. If Mexico effectively addresses some of its
prevalent problems, its desire for economic growth through FDI will certainly be realized.
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CHAPTER 4
SOUTH AFRICA
South Africa is rich in many natural resources; 253 South Africa has the highest inflows of
FDI to Africa. 254 Although South Africa has a middle- income economy, the country is still
classified as a developing country. 255 A lot of multinational and transnational businesses have
subsidiaries or branch offices located in South Africa. 256
A. Historical Evolution of U.S. FDI in South Africa.
Though South Africa presently enjoys a good and stable trade relationship with the U.S.
Historically the trade relationship between the countries was quite difficult at times. There has
always been an influx of U.S. foreign direct investors into South Africa. 257 Because of the vast
development of South Africa’s manufacturing base during World War II, the country generated a
lot of interest from U.S investors. 258 At that time, the focus of U.S. investors was most evident in
high-tech electronics and military equipment. 259 In 1969, U.S. returns from South Africa
averaged 9.5 percent when the return from all countries averaged 4.9 percent. 260 This situation
continued over the years and by 1981, U.S. direct investment in South Africa had escalated to
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$2.6 billion. 261 Despite widespread criticism of the Apartheid system, the U.S. adopted a neutral
policy known as constructive engagement.262 The essence of this policy was to impose limited
economic restrictions on South Africa while U.S. investors continued to do business with the
Apartheid government. 263 In 1943, prior to the Apartheid era, U.S. direct investment in South
Africa was $50 million but after the inception of Apartheid and the constructive engagement
policy, this figure increased by 4000 percent to $2 billion in 1978. 264 The U.S. government was
criticized and accused of maintaining South Africa as an ally despite its Apartheid policy. 265
The U.S. government defended the constructive engagement policy and merely implored
U.S. investors in South Africa to adhere to the Sullivan Principles. 266 Few U.S. investors adhered
to the Sullivan Principles; out of the three hundred U.S. companies in South Africa, only one
hundred and thirty- five were signatories to the Sullivan Principles after ten years. 267 Eventually,
from the late 1970’s through the early 1980’s, some U.S. investors disinvested their businesses
from South Africa because of widespread criticism by the interna tional community. 268 U.S.
investors were also pressured to disinvest by student protestors and legislature passed by some
state and local governments. 269 The Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 270 also affected
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the financial activities of U.S. investors in South Africa. 271 This Act was passed by the U.S.
Congress and overrode weaker sanctions that were proposed by President Reagan. 272 This caused
U.S. nationals who had invested their pension funds with U.S. investors in South Africa to
withdraw their investments. 273
By February 1990, South African President De Klerk lifted all bans on anti-apartheid
groups. 274 Two weeks later, the imprisoned leader of the opposition African National Congress
(A.N.C.), Nelson Mandela, was released. 275 In 1991, all Apartheid laws were finally abolished
and the country’s first non-racial elections were held on May 10, 1994. 276 Since the abolition of
Apartheid, several U.S. companies use South Africa as their foundation to extend their
businesses to other African countries.277
B. Factors that Attract U.S. Investors to South Africa.
South Africa’s attractiveness to U.S. investors is due to many factors. A 1999 report by
the Investor Responsibility Research Center of Washington D.C. stated that many U.S.
companies doing business in South Africa rated it as one of the best in terms of its infrastructure, legal system, abundance of raw materials and macroeconomic management. 278 South
Africa’s investment guide 279 provides many incentives to investors. There are no capital gains
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taxes in South Africa. 280 Another advantage for FDI in South Africa is that as the company
increases, so does the percentage of permissible borrowing. 281
Foreign direct investors also enjoy the following incentives: (1) almost all business
sectors are open to investors in South Afr ica, 282 (2) foreign investors do not necessarily need
government approval for an investment project though precise FDI procedures are provided for
foreign direct investors, 283 (3) foreign direct investors are exempt from VAT being imposed on
their exports of foods and services, 284 (4) foreign direct investors can import capital goods
without paying any duty and,

285

(5) foreign investors may be given tax allowances of either 50

or 100 percent when the investment project is approved

286

and, (6) several governmental

agencies exist to assist foreign investors in areas of finance, information, marketing and finding
business premises. 287
Foreign direct investors have quick access to obtaining licenses and permits. There are no
restrictions on the number of foreign employees on a company’s payroll. Foreign employees are
also subject to the same employment as local residents to prevent bias. 288 To enable South Africa
to offer many investment incentives to foreign investors, each South African region has created
agencies that offer investment incentives. 289
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Though South Africa is not a member of the International Center for the Settlement of
Disputes, all of the country’s bilateral agreements provide that in situations where disputes
cannot be settled amicably, the foreign investor may choose the dispute mechanism. 290 This
provision is a courtesy extended to investors and may be sufficient to boost investor confidence.
The South African government has formed an International Task Force to provide
information technology. 291 This task force may help the country become more technologically
advanced which will eventually boost the FDI appeal of South Africa. South Africa has very
developed financial institutions; The Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) is one of the ten
largest stock exchanges in the world. 292 There are a plethora of banks in South Africa, quite a
number of them are foreign-owned or subsidiary companies of foreign investors. 293
U.S investors also feel welcome to invest in South Africa because it entered into a
bilateral tax treaty with the country on January 1, 1998. 294 Foreign direct investors find the
automobile industry appealing because automobile components like aluminum and steel are
locally produced in South Africa. 295 Aluminum is power- intensive and since South Africa has
one of the cheapest electricity markets in the world, 296 it is easier to produce automobiles in the
country. 297

290

Brendan Vickers, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Regime in the Republic of South Africa. February 2002,
available at http://cuts.org/ifd-Im-c r-safrica.doc
291
SOUTH AFRICA CHAMBER OF COMMERCE (2002), this task force has prestigious members like Carly
Fiorina, President and CEO of Hewlett Packard, Larry Ellison, CEO and founder of Oracle Corporation, and Jorma
Ollila, CEO of Nokia.
292
Stephanie R. Nicholas, Privatizing South Africa’s Industries and the Law and Economics of a New Socialist
Utopia, 30 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 721, 757 (1999).
293
Id.
294
U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, BUREAU OF AFRICA AFFAIRS, April 2002.
295
DEPT. OF TRADE & INDUSTRY, supra note 283.
296
Id.
297
Id.

42
C. Factors that Hinder U.S. FDI in South Africa.
Though U.S investors remain the largest investors in South Africa, their dominance in
South Africa FDI started diminishing in 1999. 298 By 1994, there was more outbound FDI from
South Africa than inbound FDI to the country299 Potential U.S. foreign direct investors are
cautious about investing in South Africa because local investors do not seem interested in
investing in their own country, despite the country’s plethora of natural resources and
manpower. 300
There is a problem of economic uncertainty in South Africa. 301 Though FDI accounted
for 27.5 percent of South Africa’s GDP in 1981, by 2000 it accounted for only 14.9 percent of
the GDP. The Rand lost 6.5 percent of its’ value against the dollar during the first eight months
of 2001. After the events of September 11th , the Rand further depreciated by 10 percent against
the leading world currencies. 302 Limitations are imposed on lending to corporations, partnerships,
and joint ventures if those entities have foreign ownership in excess of 25 percent. 303 Foreign
investors in South Africa are also required to hire resident South African auditors and resident
South Africans for the duty of service of process. 304
Some of the multinational companies that want to invest in South Africa are
uncomfortable with the political situation between the ANC and other parties 305 over the Kwa
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Zulu Natal province and prefer to invest in areas with stable political environments306 There are
few skilled workers in South Africa to suit investor needs. For example the Ford Company had
to train most of its assembly workers in acquiring reading and math skills. Ford hired twelve
tutors because 80 percent of its workforce was not adept in those two subjects. 307 Microsoft
Corporation spent over $200,000 to set up two digital villages to educate people on the uses of
the Internet. Ironically Microsoft now suffers form intellectual property theft because half of the
software on South African markets is pirated. 308
D. The Negative Impact of FDI on South Africa.
Some U.S. investors have taken advantage of South Africa’s liberal labor laws. 309
Because South African investment laws do not require foreign investment companies to hire a
specified percentage of its citizens, there is no regulation that can force these companies to hire
South African nationals. 310 As a result, FDI is not necessarily alleviating the unemployment
problem in South Africa. 311 Some South African companies are suffering because their businesses
compete with foreign-owned companies. 312 This competition is prevalent in the pharmaceutical,
steel, dairy and electronic industries. 313 Civil activists in South Africa are also concerned about
the inflow of FDI in South Africa. 314 These activists are concerned that foreign ownership of
South African media houses may compromise the journalistic and editorial integrity of those
media houses. Because sixty percent of South Africa’s FDI is in the form of mergers and
306

Siverson, supra note 258, at 356. Because of South Africa’s previous political history and the fact that foreign
direct investors ultimately suffered because of the Apartheid system, it is understandable that U.S. investors would
be hesitant to invest in a country with lingering political problems.
307
Id.
308
Id.
309
Id. Rockwell Automation, a U.S. investor, prefers to use electronic equipment to control machines rather than to
hire workers.
310
Id.
311
Id.
312
Vickers, supra note 289.
313
Id.
314
Id.

44
acquisitions between foreign investors and local companies, most FDI activities are geared
towards already established sectors and not new sectors.

315

E. Recommendation.
South Africa still has more room for improvement. Though privatization may be a good
way of attracting investors into South Africa, the government should not rush into privatizing too
many state-owned businesses. Because of the previous Apartheid situation, privatization may be
very touchy for South Africans and could lead to resentment of foreign investors by its nationals.
This situation may lead to major political problems and drive away foreign investors. The South
African government should encourage investors to establish new businesses rather than just
engaging in mergers and acquisitions. Though the latter still profits the country, more growth
will be seen when new businesses are established. Such a situation would also cause more
investors to be attracted to South Africa.
Besides establishing traditional educational institutions, vocational institutions also need
to be established. Vocational institutions provide specialization for people who desire more
specific skills. South African schools should be equipped with adequate materials for
technological education. If this is done, the country will attain more recognition for its
advancement among developing countries and this will cause more foreign direct investors to be
interested in South Africa. South Africa’s government may also increase employment
opportunities by including a provision in its investment guide that requires foreign investors to
hire a certain percentage of the South African nationals as is done in Malaysia.
Despite appalling economic conditions, corruption is rife in many African countries and
this is internationally known. Most of the time the victims of corruption are foreign investors
because the culprits are high-ranking individuals for government agencies. Investors sometimes
315

Id.

45
have to pay exorbitant sums of money to have their businesses approved and registered. South
Africa needs to establish an efficient anti-corruption campaign to assure investor confidence.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
The initial idea for this topic was to determine the legal factors that hindered African
nations in their quest to attract foreign direct investment. However, it is almost impossible to
discuss this problem without considering the belief of developing countries that FDI is the sole
solution to their economic problems.
To discuss FDI in developing countries would be too broad, hence the idea to select
three developing countries from three regions of the world and compare the FDI triumphs and
failures. Once again, it would be too broad to discuss the activities of all foreign investors in
these three countries; therefore a case study of U.S. investors was selected for this paper. Many
investments worldwide are carried on by U.S. businesses. Malaysia, Mexico and South Africa
were not only selected because they have many foreign investors, but also because they have
unique foreign investment regimes and policies. The FDI uniqueness of each country ranged
from restrictive nationalistic policies to rather liberal investment policies.
The growth of U.S. FDI is not equal in the three countries. They have different economic
capabilities, and as developing countries some of them are more developed than others. In this
discussion, Malaysia, Mexico, and South Africa generally represent all aspects of developing
countries.
A. Recommendations for Regulatory and Other Reform.
Generally, developing countries around the world appear to share similar FDI ideals and
problems. Some of the ideals are increased employment, higher economic development and the
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availability of foreign exchange. The more pervasive problems are, limited and underdeveloped
infrastructure, limited educational status of workforce and stunted economic growth.
Interestingly, they all have very unique approaches to attracting FDI and the key factor to this
uniqueness is in the contents of their foreign investment policies and the regulations that ensure
their enforcement.
1. Africa.
Some developing countries have embarked on deregulating and liberalizing their
restrictive investment laws. Unfortunately many African countries continue to make unrealistic
investment policies. Though there are numerous factors that determine why Africa receives the
least FDI worldwide, the two prominent issues facing FDI on the continent stem from restrictive
foreign investment policies and the misconception that excessive incentives would be most
attractive to foreign direct investors. Examples of restrictive investment policies are seen where
countries require high capital amount for FDI while others require foreign direct investors to
employ a high and fixed percentage of their nationals.
Though investment capital is very necessary, high investment costs need to be reduced
and the percentage for hiring citizens should be reasonable. In light of the poor perception of
Africa, foreign investors may be coaxed into Africa if the investment policies are made less
restrictive.
African countries should be cautious about giving generous tax incentives to investors at
the expense of their economies. The cost of providing too many incentives is that it is a onesided benefit for the investor while the countries suffers economically. African countries need to
consider whether they can afford to ‘survive’ without certain resources before they offer them as
incentives to foreign investors. They also need to consider the idea of replacing tax incentives
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with a system that abolishes exchange controls and provides for the repatriation of the investor
profits and free trade zones. These are the types of incentives that foreign investors may find to
be truly attractive.
Foreign investment policies must be transparent and comprehensible. Even the legal
language in some investment policies is unattractive to foreign investors because it is difficult for
foreign investors to easily understand the contents of the policies and regulations. African
countries that have conservative and archaic foreign investment policies are less attractive to
foreign investors. African countries should not only make investment regulations more
transparent to ensure investor confidence, but also consider the introduction of neo- liberalism in
their investment policies. African countries need to realize the importance of membership in
internationally recognized arbitration groups and how such membership may attract foreign
investors.
Also, African countries need to realize the need for foreign investment consultants and
tax lawyers to address FDI issues. These professionals are assets to the concept of FDI because
they possess adequate information on many FDI issues. The cost of training and retaining such
specialists should not prevent African countries from realizing potential benefits of such
professional advice.
Many African countries lack effective financial institutions. To worsen this existing
problem, African economies are so small that few African markets have access to international
capital markets. This affects foreign investment attractiveness. Though South Africa is
recognized for having one of the best financial institutions worldwide, the rest of Africa is
lagging behind. There creation of well-organized and effective financial institutions would make
more African countries attractive for FDI.
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In addition to forming organizations like the African Union, African countries need to
form economic coalitions among themselves; in Asia, they have ASEAN and in Latin America
they have the Southern Common Market (MECOSUR). The importance of these coalitions is
that they are more effective in attracting foreign investors because each member country may
contribute a unique resource for FDI. Such coalitions also tend to be well organized.
In terms of technology and communication, Africa is lagging behind the rest of the world.
Except for countries in the southern part of Africa and a few countries in North Africa, there is
little technological growth in Africa. In most sub-Saharan African countries, basic computer
training is not part of the educational systems. The average African student has little familiarity
with the use of computers. Internet café’s are common in many African cities; however, because
of the high cost of using computers and frequent power outages, individuals are unable to
educate themselves technologically. As a result, foreign investors spend huge sums of money in
training local personnel on how to use computers.
A major impediment to Africa’s FDI attractiveness is the foreign media. For decades, the
continent has been portrayed as very backward. Pictures in foreign newspapers and television
rarely show the developed side of Africa. The tendency of foreign media to negatively stereotype
all African countries is affecting the quest for FDI by individual countries. African leaders need
to advocate for a change in this situation. African countries need to individually and collectively
make efforts through advertising and other promotional resources to emphasize their FDI
potential.
Bureauc racy is a big problem in Africa’s quest for FDI. There are so many government
agencies that must be negotiated with in individual countries. Bureaucratic tendencies and
political wrangling also affect FDI inflow. Foreign direct investors are subject to unnecessary
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and lengthy approval procedures before being granted permission to commence business.
Sometimes the officials in government agencies that deal with FDI do not possess the skill for
their jobs and this makes the process more frustrating to foreign investors. Government agencies
that handle FDI should be limited to a few and countries need a total revamp of such agencies. In
many African countries, local investors do not seem to receive the same encouragement given to
foreign investors. If the same emphasis placed on attracting FDI were placed on encouraging
domestic privatization or local investment, there would be a definite growth in African
economies. This growth would also make Africa more attractive for FDI.
2. Latin America.
Latin American countries appear to have more attractive foreign investment policies and
regulations than most countries within Africa. Unlike Africa, many countries in the region
receive a fair amount of FDI inflow. Latin American countries have modified and enacted laws
that are more realistic and responsive to their goals of attracting FDI. Because of their efforts to
create liberal trade regimes, most Latin American countries do not have restrictive foreign
investment policies. However, there are a few Latin American countries like Nicaragua, Uruguay
and Costa Rico maintain harsh capital inflow policies that affect their FDI inflow. These
countries need to do away with restrictive laws that would deter foreign direct investors.
Regulatory uncertainty is also an FDI concern in Latin America. When countries
suddenly modify tax laws, it affects the activities of foreign investors. Foreign direct investors
need to be provided with adequate time to adjust when tax laws are changed. If this were done,
more investors would become more interested in the region.
Investment policies need to be consistent with the development strategies of the
individual Latin American countries. Latin American countries need to implement policies and
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labor laws to discourage mass migration to foreign countries. This would ensure wealth in
manpower for FDI purposes. Latin American countries may need to consider forming a union
like the EU of Europe. The formation of such a union may encourage FDI exchange among
member countries as well as fostering stability and attracting investment from outside the union.
3. Asia (Excluding Middle East).
FDI has been a key source of growth for some developing countries within in Asia. One
of the factors affecting FDI flow in Asia is restrictive national foreign investment policy. Asian
countries that screen foreign direct investors through screening agencies or Boards of Investment
need to make the process more efficient. Though screening is not a bad idea, the process
sometimes becomes political and time-consuming. Screening agencies will be most effective if
they are independent of government interference. Ownership restriction is also an FDI concern
among developing countries in Asia. Instead of total restriction on land ownership, Asian
countries should consider assigning or leasing lands to foreign investors for specific periods,
allowing the government to claim the land the land back after expiration of the agreement. This
would be fair to investors who genuinely need the land for production.
Some Asian countries also need to revamp their legal framework to achieve FDI
attractiveness. If Asian countries truly want to liberalize trade with investors, reliable and
transparent laws must be enacted to replace old laws. Transparency will be hard to achieve as
long as government interference remains. Investment regulations should be fair and investors
assured of legal protection where necessary. Though Asian countries like Indonesia, China and
Malaysia are making efforts to deregulate and liberalize some of their investment and trade
policies, these efforts need to prevail in all developing parts of Asia to maintain sustained
economic growth.
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4. Other Developing Parts of the World.
The quest by developing countries for FDI has not been restricted to Africa, Asia and
Latin America. Developing countries in Europe, the Middle East and the Caribbean are also
interested in FDI inflow to their countries.
a. The Middle East.
FDI in the Middle East is affected by the political tension in the region. Wealth in oil and
petroleum makes the region quite attractive for FDI. Privatization may be the key to FDI growth
in the Middle East. Because of the ongoing strife in the region, it may be easier to convince
investors to merge with existing businesses than to create new ones.
b. The Caribbean.
Most Caribbean countries enjoy a fairly modest inflow of foreign direct investment. FDI
flow into the region mainly stems from privatization. Labor is cheap in most Caribbean
countries; however, their small size affects FDI in terms of insufficient manpower and natural
resources to establish large manufacturing companies. Caribbean countries need to make their
labor laws more flexible and provide incentives that prevent harsh treatment of foreign investors
during periods of internal economic crises. Countries within the Caribbean also need to embark
on more liberalization of their trade policies.
c. Europe.
Some Balkan countries cause their own FDI demise through poor legal frameworks.
Balkan countries with archaic and conservative investment policies need to modernize them.
This will make policies more transparent and easier for foreign direct investors to appreciate
their foreign investment policies. Balkan countries also need more independent agencies and
legal mechanisms to ensure the effectiveness of investment laws.
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B. Final Remarks.
There is a positive increase in regulation change affecting FDI; 316 in 1991 there were only
80 regulation changes, this number increased to 194 in 2001. This indicates that more countries
are becoming aware of policy change on FDI. In 2001, developing countries suffered a 59
percent decrease in worldwide flows of FDI, while developed countries saw a 14 percent
increase. 317 Though total FDI worldwide was $735 billion, $503 went to developed countries and
only $205 went to developing countries. 318 Developing countries need more FDI inflow than
developed countries; however, this report shows that foreign investors are more interested in
investing in developed countries. Developing countries need to stop providing costly incentives
to foreign investors. Though numerous factors contribute to the attainment of FDI growth,
developing countries should not overlook the importance of having effective regulations and
strong legal frameworks as a major requirement for FDI attractiveness. If developing countries
ignore this factor, they will continue to receive minimal FDI inflows. Without strong legal
frameworks, enforceable legal institutions, transparency and predictability, foreign investors will
continue to flock to developed countries where these factors abound.

316

UNCTAD, “World Investment Report 2002, Transnational Corporations and Export Competitiveness”, (2002),
available at http://www.unctad.org
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Id.
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